Iran recently marked the 40th day of mourning for protesters killed in the crackdown on demonstrations that initially erupted over the rising cost of living and later evolved into a political protest movement against the leadership, headed by Ali Khamenei.
On February 21, university students in Tehran staged demonstrations to commemorate the 40 days since the deaths of the protest victims, chanting “Freedom” and “Death to Khamenei.” Clashes were reported on several campuses after members of the Basij militia attacked demonstrators.
At the same time, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi criticized U.S. President Donald Trump over his claim that 32,000 people had been killed in the suppression of the protests. Araghchi asserted that according to Tehran’s figures, the number of fatalities stood at 3,117.
On February 14, a large rally was held in Germany attended by Reza Pahlavi, the exiled former crown prince, who called for increased international pressure on the regime in Tehran and voiced support for the popular protest movement.
According to senior Israeli intelligence assessments, despite the subsiding of the protests, deep anger persists among significant segments of the public, particularly youth and economically disadvantaged groups, due to the high cost of living, political repression, and the killing of demonstrators in previous waves of unrest.
The phenomenon of anti-regime chants from residential balconies across various parts of Iran reflects a high level of friction between the Iranian public and the regime, even if it has not yet translated into sustained mass demonstrations.
In the event of an American military strike, officials estimate there is a high likelihood of renewed protests in major cities such as Tehran, Abadan, and Mashhad. Such demonstrations could turn violent and pose significant risks, especially if civilian casualties or damage to civilian property occur.
On the other hand, fear of a harsh military response by the regime could deter some potential protesters or drive them into hiding.
Targeted protest calls and support from prominent opposition figures, such as Reza Pahlavi, son of the deposed Shah, or individuals within the reformist camp, could amplify any renewed uprising. However, a U.S. strike might also enable the regime to project an image of national unity, tighten oversight, and intensify domestic repression.
Why Did the Latest Protest Wave Fade?
The protest wave that began in December 2025 following the collapse of the national currency and worsening economic conditions failed to reach a critical mass capable of challenging regime stability.
According to Israeli security assessments, several key factors contributed to this outcome:
- Stability of the Regime’s Core – The Iranian regime remains structurally strong, supported by a central security and economic apparatus that includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, and powerful economic institutions.
- Proven Repressive Capacity – The use of force, violent dispersal of demonstrations, mass killings, internet shutdowns, and severe media restrictions.
- Lack of Support from Key Civil Sectors – The Tehran bazaar and major sectors such as oil industry workers did not join the protest wave.
- Absence of a Strong Opposition Leadership – No organized body capable of coordinating a sustained nationwide protest movement exists, and leading reformist figures maintained a low profile without mobilizing large scale demonstrations.
Accordingly, the renewal of a significant protest movement would require a combination of internal security breakdown, cross sector mobilization among major anti regime constituencies, sustained organizational capacity, and a fracture within the regime’s ruling core. Without these elements, protests are likely to remain fragmented and limited in impact.
In conclusion, according to intelligence assessments in Israel and the West, Iran is still considered a relatively stable state, and the likelihood of a major protest wave reemerging in the near term remains low.
A U.S. military strike could reignite limited public anger, but the success of any broad-based uprising would depend primarily on internal dynamics rather than external military force.
