Summary
The Lebanese Armed Forces function as a unifying institution in a deeply divided society, aiming to maintain civil peace above all else. Their stance toward Hizbullah reflects a delicate balance between coexistence and pressure to assert full state authority. Dependence on international support sustains the الجيش but also raises questions about external influence. Future effectiveness hinges on gaining sufficient political backing and resources to act as the sole security authority.
Key Takeaways
- The army prioritizes preserving internal stability and unity across sectarian divisions, often choosing neutrality to avoid fragmentation.
- Its relationship with Hizbullah complicates its independence, with informal coordination and a longstanding policy of avoiding direct confrontation.
- Heavy reliance on foreign aid shapes its capabilities and decisions, creating tension between national autonomy and external influence.
The loyalty of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a complex issue in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Rather than clear national or foreign loyalty, the LAF balances domestic sectarian dynamics and international interests.
To understand where its loyalty lies, it is helpful to look at the army through three different lenses:
How does the LAF maintain unity in a deeply divided society?
First, the LAF is widely regarded as the only truly cross-sectarian institution in Lebanon. In a country deeply divided by religion and politics, the army is one of the few entities that enjoys broad trust across Sunni, Shia, Christian, and Druze communities. Its primary institutional loyalty is to preserving civil peace. Historically, the army has often chosen neutrality during internal conflicts, such as in 2008 or the 2019 protests, to prevent its own collapse. If the army were to take a side in a sectarian fight, it would likely fracture along religious lines, as happened during the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. Because the army has this unifying image, its chiefs have been elected as presidents since 1998. This trend embodies the army’s value as a rallying point for all sectarian communities.
General Rodolphe Heykal, the current army chief, is aware of this and considers himself a possible successor to President Joseph Aoun when his term ends. There are persistent Lebanese media reports about his special ties with Hizbullah’s leaders and alleged deals with the Shiite militia to secure their support for future presidential elections. Such a deal involved claims of eradicating Hizbullah’s positions in South Lebanon. Heykal reported to the government that the area was clear of Hizbullah’s armed presence, but he gave false information to both the Lebanese government and U.S. officials. Heykal’s double-talk was most evident during a tense meeting in Washington with Senator Lindsey Graham. Graham asked if he considered Hizbullah a terrorist organization. Heykal replied, “No, not in the context of Lebanon.” If this is the LAF chief’s view, what can the U.S. and Israel expect from the Lebanese army when it comes to implementing any agreement between Israel and Lebanon?
To what extent is the LAF influenced by Hizbullah?
Second, the most controversial aspect of the LAF’s loyalty involves its relationship with Hizbullah. Nearly sixty percent of the LAF’s rank and file are Shiites, and major positions in the army are held by Shiite officers, such as General Mounir Shehadeh, the coordinator with UNIFIL, and General Souheil Harb, head of military intelligence. Both reportedly serve as debriefers to Hizbullah on major developments involving the mechanism, Israeli-Lebanese relations, and the U.S. and other foreign powers’ interventions in Lebanese politics.
For years, the LAF has operated under a “no-confrontation” policy with Hizbullah. This is partly due to political directives from the Lebanese government and partly because a direct clash could trigger a civil war. Proponents of the “Army-People-Resistance” doctrine argue that the LAF and Hizbullah complement each other, as the army provides domestic legitimacy, while Hizbullah provides asymmetric “deterrence” against external threats. As of early 2026, the LAF is under immense pressure, both from a new Lebanese leadership and international brokers, to implement disarmament plans north of the Litani River. Critics argue that until the LAF has a monopoly on the use of force, its “national” loyalty remains compromised by Hizbullah’s Iranian-backed influence.
How does foreign aid shape the LAF’s strategic decisions?
Third, the LAF is almost entirely dependent on foreign assistance for survival, especially since the 2019 economic collapse. The U.S. is the LAF’s largest donor, providing billions in equipment and training. The American goal is to create a counterweight to Hizbullah. France and Qatar have also provided critical support, like salary subsidies and food for soldiers. This dependence fuels accusations that the LAF’s strategic decisions are influenced by Western “diktats.” However, the military leadership argues that this support is essential for national survival. Without foreign support, the army would cease to exist, leaving a vacuum for more radical groups.
Finally, the Lebanese army is essentially loyal to the idea of a unified Lebanon. Yet, it is constrained by a weak state and a heavily armed non-state actor, Hizbullah. In 2026, the LAF is trying to shift from a “coexistence” model with militias to a “sole-protector” model. However, its success depends on whether Lebanon’s political system gives it enough mandate and resources. In mid-April, the army got orders to secure the Beirut Governorate and demilitarize it after news of an aborted coup led by Hizbullah. As a result, the army deployed around key government institutions in Beirut. It is still unclear whether the army will be ready to confront Hizbullah’s organized protests. Given the LAF’s ambiguous stance toward Hizbullah, there are questions about whether the army chief would deploy troops to defend a political agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon, since Hizbullah totally opposes such an agreement. Based on the LAF’s past conduct, it is unlikely that Heykal’s army would offer such support.
